Air Interdiction

This study is an analysis of the US Air Force's air interdiction doctrine and its relationship to the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. In the United States military, each service is responsible for developing its own doctrine. The US Army has promulgated its doctrine and called it AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle relies extensively on air support for success. The US Air Force has developed its own doctrine with seemingly little regard for the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine. This study analyzes the Air Force's doctrine as it relates to air interdiction. The Normandy campaign of World War II is used as an historical example of successful air interdiction in support of operational level Army forces. The study concludes that the US Army and US Air Force doctrines are compatible. However, the doctrines as implemented do not provide support that is flexible enough for AirLand Battle. The air and ground commanders must work together to insure operational success on the AirLand battlefield. Mission type orders to air force commanders, instead of target nominations, are essential to insure that air combat power is used to its maximum potential. Operational level Army and Air Force headquarters need to be co-located to insure synchronization. Rather than having an Army element represent the land component commander at the Air Force headquarters, the joint staff should make the recommendations effecting allocation of both air and ground assets. Although the doctrines are supportive, this study concludes that there is much work to be done to make the doctrines work in harmony to insure operational level success on future battlefields.