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How the Weak Win Wars

Name: How the Weak Win Wars
Brand: Cambridge University Press
SKU: 02034743
Price: 31.16 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft
ISBN: 9780521548694

A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft

Language

English

Book Paperback

Libristo code: 02034743

Publishers Cambridge University Press, December 2005

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on th... Full description

Libristo code: 02034743

76 b

31.16 €

60.94 лв

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How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.